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Abstract
Title IV of the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act initiated a historic experiment in
incentive-based environmental regulation through the use of tradable allowances for emission
of sulfur dioxide by electric generating facilities.  To date, relatively little allowance trading has
taken place; however, the costs of compliance have been much less than anticipated.  The
purpose of this paper is to address the apparent paradox—that the allowance trading program
may not require (very much) trading to be successful.  Title IV represented two great steps
forward in environmental regulation: first a move toward performance standards and second
formal allowance trading.  The first step has been sufficient to date for improving dynamic
efficiency and achieving relative cost-effectiveness.
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Cost Savings Sans Allowance Trades?
Evaluating the SO2 Emission Trading Program To Date
Dallas Burtraw1
1.   INTRODUCTION
Title IV of the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act (CAAA) initiated a historic
experiment in incentive-based environmental regulation through the use of tradable allowances
for emission of sulfur dioxide by electric generating facilities.  Many authors, including this
one, predicted the program would perform less well than textbook theory might suggest and
the program's proponents hoped.
By the measure of success most often cited by critics and proponents alike—liquidity of
the allowance market—the program has fallen short of aspirations (Wald, 1995).  "Almost all
involved agree that the rate of trading among utilities is not as high as had been expected (and) ...is
not nearly enough to realize the kind of financial savings originally envisioned" (Zorpette, 1994).
From an economic perspective, success of incentive-based environmental regulation
can be measured in two ways.  One is productive efficiency or cost-effectiveness—the
attainment of environmental standards at minimum abatement costs.  The second is allocative,
or market efficiency—the internalization of social opportunity costs of resource use in prices.
The criterion I consider is the former, the measure of cost-effectiveness.
                                               
1 The author is a Fellow in the Quality of the Environment Division, Resources for the Future.  An earlier
version of this paper was presented at the Western Economics Association meetings in San Diego July 9, 1995
in a session organized by Steve Brown.  The author is grateful to Ron Lile for excellent research assistance,
Darius Gaskins for early guidance, and to Doug Bohi, Steve Puller, Todd Strauss and Roberton Williams for
comments.  Address correspondence to Resources for the Future, 1616 P Street NW, Washington DC  20036.
e-mail:  burtraw@rff.orgDallas Burtraw RFF 95-30REV
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In contrast with allowance market illiquidity, the industry's cost of compliance has been
surprisingly low.  Coupled with information about how these low costs have been achieved, the
evidence indicates that thus far the program has been largely successful (Rico, 1995; Strauss,
1995).  The purpose of this paper is to address the apparent paradox—that the allowance
trading program may not require (very much) trading to be successful.
There are a variety of mechanisms for compliance under Title IV in addition to
allowance trading including intrafirm reallocation of emission allowances, fuel switching and/or
blending, installing scrubbers (flue gas desulfurization), retiring plants, repowering plants,
energy conservation, reduced utilization and substitution among facilities.  Clearly, in principle
an active allowance market is neither a necessary or sufficient condition for cost effectiveness.
For instance, if permits were allocated so as to exactly equate marginal cost among facilities,
cost effectiveness would be achieved without any trading.  Under Title IV though, allowances
are allocated on the basis of historic emissions without reference to cost, so ample trading
might be anticipated.
In fact there has not been much allowance trading, but since 1990 there have been
dramatic changes in the prices of abatement options available to utilities.  These changes stem
from changes in the prices of rail transport of low sulfur coal, increased productivity in mining,
as well as innovations in the use of fuel blending and in the design and use of scrubbers.
The hypothesis I develop is that changes in compliance costs are to a significant degree
attributable to regulatory innovation embodied in Title IV.  Even in the absence of robust
allowance trading, the program has empowered utilities with the flexibility to take advantage of
exogenous changes in input markets, such as a decline in the cost and an increase in availabilityDallas Burtraw RFF 95-30REV
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of low sulfur coal.  Moreover, this flexibility has promoted competition between input markets
that has encouraged innovation and amplified cost savings.
Although Title IV is widely known for instituting a system of allowance trading, it
actually represents two giant steps forward in environmental regulation.  The first step moves
from traditional command and control to performance based regulation.  This means that the
regulation provides a standard of performance but does not specify what actions the firm
should take for compliance.  In contrast, rules implementing the 1977 Clean Air Act
Amendments effectively mandated the use of scrubbers for new sources, and emissions from
existing sources were largely ignored with respect to long range transport of SO2.  However,
under the 1990 Amendments, Title IV imposes a performance standard on all sources (which
varies with vintage of the facility).  This affords firms flexibility in compliance and places into
competition input markets for various abatement options.
The second giant step of Title IV would move from performance standards to
interutility allowance trading.  For a variety of reasons, this step has yet to be realized fully; but
to date prolific interutility trading has not been necessary to achieve relative cost-effectiveness.
Figure 1 illustrates the story of regulatory reform implicit in Title IV.  In general the
program moves away from a command and control toward incentive-based regulation, which
encompasses a variety of approaches.  Currently implementation of Title IV resembles most
closely performance standards.  One observes intrautility trading among a firm's facilities as a
means to achieve compliance, but not much interutility trading.  Nonetheless firms have
flexibility to choose a compliance strategy, in contrast with a command and control approach
that would prescribe technology standards for each facility.Dallas Burtraw RFF 95-30REV
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The complementary relationship between performance standards and allowance
trading was not widely anticipated.  At the time of adoption, advocates of Title IV hung its
anticipated cost savings and success on extensive allowance trading.  The surprise in Phase I
of its implementation (through the year 1999) is that cost savings have been achieved sans
allowance trading.
Performance standards can work well to achieve cost effectiveness if firms have similar
marginal costs because each firm can innovate in a similar fashion.  However, when the
marginal costs of compliance differ significantly between firms, then performance standards
will perform poorly.  Reconciling differences in marginal costs then requires a fuller
implementation of incentive-based regulation such as robust allowance exchange.
The emergence of low sulfur coal as a widely available low-cost compliance option
helps to explain the apparent success thus far.  This development was spawned by exogenous
changes in fuel markets, but it required and was encouraged by the incentive-based approach inDallas Burtraw RFF 95-30REV
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Title IV.  In the absence of this reform these cost savings would not have been achievable.
Moreover, competition among input markets and suppliers of abatement technology has led to
technical innovation among the various options for abatement, resulting in improved dynamic
efficiency that has reduced the cost of compliance.
Hence, success to date is the result of fundamental regulatory reform of environmental
regulation which has promoted efficient implementation through economic competition.
Nonetheless, in the future performance standards may not be sufficient if low sulfur coal markets
become constrained, especially after the year 2000 when Phase II of Title IV will greatly expand
the program's coverage.  Firms may then face widely disparate marginal costs for compliance and
allowance trading may become essential to the program's success.  And in this event, several
obstacles to allowance trading including ineffective regulatory guidance and rent seeking by state
regulators would become increasingly pertinent to future success of the program.
The next section provides background for the allowance trading program, and helps to
explain the low quantity of allowance trades to date.  Section 3 addresses the low price of
allowances through a survey of developments and interactions between input markets for
compliance.  Section 4 summarizes the analysis of the program to date.
2.  BACKGROUND  ON  TITLE  IV  OF  THE  CAAA
Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Amendments was the final incarnation of dozens of
legislative initiatives in Congress over the last decade aimed at concerns about acid rain.
Regulation of SO2, the most important precursor of acid rain, is addressed through an
innovative program of transferable emission allowances.  Phase I of the program took effect in
1995 and requires the 110 "dirtiest" electric utility coal fired power plants to reduce SO2Dallas Burtraw RFF 95-30REV
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emissions averaged across these facilities to about 2.5 lb. per million Btu (mmBtu).  This
average is expressed in discrete emissions based on historic facility utilization rates, equivalent
to about 6.9 million tons annually across all affected sources (including bonuses for
conservation, early reduction, and incentives for scrubbing, etc.).  Annual  allowances for
emissions are endowed to facility operators at zero cost, they are transferable, and may be
banked for use in future years.  Phase II of the program takes effect in 2000, and will affect all
utility sources greater than 25 MW burning fossil fuels.  It will lower average emissions to
below 1.2 lb. SO2 per mmBtu, equivalent to a total of about 8.95 million tons of SO2
emissions annually.  Among many subtle provisions of the statute is an annual auction of about
2.8 percent of allowances which began in 1993, to help jump-start market exchange.
Prior to passage, a primary focus of attention toward the SO2 program was directed
toward the allowance trading component. Studies in advance of the legislation found
significant differences in the marginal costs of emission reductions among firms (USEPA,
1989).  In principle, within a system of transferable emission allowances, a firm with relatively
high marginal costs of emission reduction would have an incentive to subsidize emission
reductions by another firm with relatively low marginal costs.  Tradable allowances were to be
the formal currency of such transactions.
However, by early 1995 interutility transactions totaling little more than 2.3 million
allowances had occurred involving 27 major trades.2  A number of articles have offered
explanations for why allowance trading might be handicapped.  One explanation revolves
                                               
2 A major trade involved more than 10,000 allowances (Rico, 1995).  These estimates exclude transactions
through the annual auction, totaling 326,210.Dallas Burtraw RFF 95-30REV
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around transaction costs that may reduce gains from market activity (Stavins, 1995).  Another
points to several aspects of standard regulation of electric utilities that tend to inhibit trading
(Bohi and Burtraw, 1991). For example, the relative costs of investment in abatement
technology and in allowances, as seen by the utility, may differ from the relative market prices
of the options because of rules established by state regulators that enable the utility to recover
the cost of investment in each option.  The allowed rate of return, the depreciation rate, and
risk that expenses may not be recoverable in electricity rates are likely to differ among
compliance strategies favoring one strategy over another.  Furthermore, typical prohibitions
against shareholder earnings on capital gains (but not capital losses) imposes one-sided risk on
utilities that purchase allowances.
Moreover, uncertainty about the evolution of regulatory rules has inspired caution toward
the market.  The problem was amplified in the early stages of the market because utilities were
required to submit compliance plans to the EPA for Phase I by February 15, 1993, before EPA's
rules were proposed or the first allowance auction was held in the Spring of 1993.  The Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) provided guidance for accounting rules regarding
allowances in March 1993, but FERC and state public utility commissions (PUCs) have provided
little guidance regarding cost recovery rules.  The rules that have been developed erode the
incentive to trade.  For example, all states except Connecticut treat allowances as current period
expenses analogous to fuel purchases, and costs (or cost savings) are passed through to
ratepayers.  This provides little incentive for the utility to reduce costs through the purchase or
sale of allowances because they expose the utility to risk for which there is little reward since
according to most PUC cost recovery rules the gains from allowance sales are passed through toDallas Burtraw RFF 95-30REV
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ratepayers, while the utility bears the risk that previous allowance transactions may be viewed as
imprudent from an ex post perspective by the regulator.  In addition, in most instances allowance
costs are not recoverable until the year in which the allowance is used (interest charges on capital
costs of allowances are recoverable), which ties up capital and discourages purchase and banking
of allowances as a compliance strategy for use years into the future.
A related problem is explicit prohibitions by legislatures on trades that might undermine
local economic activity, especially production of coal (Winebrake et al., 1995).  Nearly every
state with substantial Phase I compliance obligations enacted legislation to promote the use of
local coal (Bohi, 1994; Rose, 1995).  Perhaps the most aggressive attempt was an Illinois law
subsequently struck down by the courts that would have encouraged electric utilities to burn
coal mined in the state by requiring installation of scrubbers as part of their Clean Air Act
compliance. Other laws aimed at the same goal in more subtle ways, for instance, by offering
preapproval for cost recovery of investments in scrubbers.
Finally, the public has responded in unfriendly ways to announcements of trades,
criticizing both the sellers and buyers of allowances.  As a consequence, there are ample hurdles
to allowance trading and ample explanations why trading has been slow to develop.
3.  WHAT  EXPLAINS  LOW  ALLOWANCE  PRICES?
The discussion heretofore helps to explain why there has been little trading, but it does
not directly explain why the price of allowances has been far below forecast.  The range of
price forecasts and realizations over the last few years is presented in Table 1.  Before passage
of the Clean Air Act estimates of marginal abatement costs were as high as $1500 per ton,
which is the figure stipulated in the Act for direct allowance sales by the EPA. In debatesDallas Burtraw RFF 95-30REV
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surrounding the 1990 amendments the EPA cited estimates of marginal abatement costs about
half as high, which became the basis for estimates of allowance prices.  After passage estimates
have fallen further.  The price of allowances traded privately is about $170.  The marginal price of
1995 allowances in the EPA auction administered by the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) has
ranged from $122 to $140.





















$1500 $750 $250 $170 $122 $140 $126
* Rico, 1995
Explanations for the observed low prices fall into two categories—they are either
institutional in nature, or hinge on market fundamentals.  From an institutional perspective,
the paramount concern has been the actions (or lack thereof) of state PUCs discussed
previously.  Uncertainty and PUC policies burden allowance purchases, thereby depressing
demand and willingness to pay for allowances.  In addition, many analysts have criticized the
EPA's allowance auction as a poorly designed institution that generates prices below those
emerging from bilateral trades between utilities.  The auction design set forth in statute is a
discriminating price, sealed bid auction that provides strategic incentives for bidders to underbid
their reservation prices (Cason, 1993).
The other institutional explanation has to do with another of the subtle provisions of
Title IV, the "extra" 3.5 million allowances introduced in Phase I.  These allowances were aDallas Burtraw RFF 95-30REV
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political concession in the 1990 legislation as a subsidy to utilities which install scrubbers in
order to cushion the blow to states producing high sulfur coal.  The effect of this provision,
coupled with PUC policies discussed previously, is to encourage scrubbing even if it is not the
least cost option for these utilities in terms of social opportunity costs.  Scrubbing makes
allowances available in Phase I, thereby increasing the supply of allowances in Phase I and
depresses their price.
The other type of explanation for low allowance prices hinges on market fundamentals
having to do with changes in input markets, including coal markets, rail transportation of coal,
and equipment suppliers.  This is a less appreciated and less understood source of change in the
market and where we next devote attention.
Evolution of Input Markets
The most important development in the implementation of Title IV has been the fall of
prices in coal and scrubber markets.  In 1990 many analysts projected average prices for low-
sulfur Central Appalachian coal to reach $40 per ton by 1995, but it is now less than $25.
Scrubber prices have fallen considerably over this period.
One explanation for this turn of events is the unanticipated degree that input markets
have been brought into direct competition, manifesting dynamic efficiency in the affected
industries.  The result has been technological innovation and investment resulting in a decline
in prices below forecast in every potential option for compliance.  In the next sections we
review these developments.Dallas Burtraw RFF 95-30REV
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Changes in Coal Markets
Coal is mined from three major areas in the United States referred to as the
Appalachian region, the Interior region and the Western region.  Appalachian coal is mined in
both surface and underground mines and is typically bituminous in rank with low-to-medium
sulfur content (0.5 to 2.0  percent sulfur by weight).  Its heat content averages over 24 mmBtu
per ton, and is transported primarily by train to electric utility plants throughout the east (US
Energy Information Administration, 1989, pp. 1-5).
Interior coal is generally surface mined but there is significant production from
underground mines. It is primarily bituminous in rank with a high percentage of sulfur (1.5 to
4.5 percent sulfur) and contains approximately 23 mmBtu per ton.  The Interior region is less
dependent on rail transportation because of transportation via barges on the Mississippi river
(US Energy Information Administration, 1989, pp. 1-5).
Western coal is surfaced mined primarily.  Over one-half of the coal in this region is
subbituminous coal that is low in sulfur content (less than 1 percent sulfur) and contains
approximately 18 mmBtu per ton.  The majority of the low sulfur coal originates in the Powder
River Basin of northeast Wyoming and southeast Montana.  Coal from this region is delivered
by rail to plants as far east as Georgia.  Table 2 reflects the 1991 estimated recoverable coal
reserves by region and sulfur content.  Clearly, Western coal has a prominent future.
Fuel switching to and fuel blending with low sulfur coal has proven to be the most
popular compliance option to date.  The striking decline in prices, especially for low sulfur
coal, helps to explain this trend.  The price of delivered coal has declined since 1985 due in
large part to productivity increases.  Also contributing to the decline in prices was theDallas Burtraw RFF 95-30REV
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increased competition in the rail transportation sector which is discussed below.  Some electric
utilities have bought out older contracts and have increased purchases under newer, less
expensive contracts.  Additionally, some contracts allow for annual adjustments in response to
changes in energy-related indices.
Table 2.  Estimates of recoverable coal reserves by region and sulfur content, 1991*
(Million Short Tons)




 > 1.68 lb. Sulfur
per mmBtu Total
Appalachian 12,291 20,237 22,558 55,086
Interior 548 11,970 48,693 61,210
Western 87,332 52,098  8,956 148,386
Total 100,171 84,305 80,206 264,682
* U S Energy Information Administration, 1995, p. 48
Table 3.  Average annual percent change in delivered cost (nominal) of coal, petroleum
and natural gas, 1983 - 93*
Fuel Type 1983-1993 1989-1993
Coal -8.8 -7.8
Natural Gas -9.0 -4.3
Petroleum -10.4 -9.2
* US Energy Information Administration, 1993, pp. 10, 16, and 22
Table 3 depicts the average nominal delivered cost of coal compared to the average
costs of natural gas and petroleum from 1983-1993.3  Throughout this period all prices fell
                                               
3 During this time frame, the real cost (1987 dollars) of coal dropped from $40.13 to $23.06 per short ton.
Note in both tables that the average delivered cost of coal jumped back up in 1990.  For 1990, however, the real
cost (1987 dollars) continued to fall.  This trend is also true for 1994 where the average delivered cost
(nominal) of coal was $28.03 per short ton.Dallas Burtraw RFF 95-30REV
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consistently.  Most closely linked with coal is the natural gas market, where price changes
outpaced those for coal in the first part of this period, but fell behind since passage of the Clean Air
Act Amendments.
In 1988, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) predicted that production of
high sulfur coal in the Interior Region would increase by 44 percent by the year 2000, due to
forecasted increase in the use of scrubbers with new lignite-fired power plants.  Instead, about
50 million tons of production for Phase I has shifted away from high sulfur coal markets to low
sulfur coal.  From 1989 to 1993 Appalachian coal production has increased 3.1 percent,
Western coal has increased by 3.7 percent, and Interior coal has decreased by 4.1 percent
(USEIA, 1994a, pp. xvii, 5, 38, 60, 71,146, 147, 162, 163, and 183).
An interesting empirical question is the potential emergence of a sulfur premium in the
pricing of fuels.  Under the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, there was little value to the sulfur
differentiation in coal because new source performance standards (Section 111) effectively forced
adoption of specific technologies.  Rules written in 1979 to implement the 1977 amendments
imposed a minimum SO2 reduction standard of 90 percent on high sulfur coal and 70 percent on
low sulfur coal, effectively requiring the use of scrubbers on all coal and eliminating the incentive
for use of low sulfur coal.  So-called compliance coal, with an emission rate below 1.2 lb. SO2
per mmBtu, was in demand by facilities built between 1970 and 1977.  But for facilities built
before 1970 and after 1977 there was little incentive to use lower sulfur coal.Dallas Burtraw RFF 95-30REV
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The 1990 CAAA should provide reason for a sulfur premium to emerge.  Conjectures
about a premium vary, but as of yet it is not apparent.4  Table 4 indicates that from 1990 to
1994, low and medium sulfur fuels have expanded production by 28 percent, while high sulfur
fuel production has fallen by over 18 percent.  While prices have fallen by 6.2 percent on
average, they have fallen the most in the low sulfur category, by 8.8 percent, suggesting that a
premium for low sulfur fuel would be hard to detect at this juncture.  The average sulfur
content of coal over this period has fallen by over 12 percent.
Table 4.  Total US coal receipts and average price by sulfur content, 1990 and 1994*
 < 0.60 lb. Sulfur
per MM Btu
  0.61-1.67 lb. Sulfur
per mmBtu






























1990 277,544  148 299,743  148 209,340  141 786,627  145   1.29
1994 354,944  135 305,939  138 171,046  132 831,929  136   1.13
* U S Energy Information Administration, 1991, p. 68; and U S Energy Information Administration, 1995, p. 91
As one example of the low cost of compliance using low sulfur coal, Phase I
obligations of Title IV will cost the Southern Company, which will rely heavily on fuel
switching, about $292 million.  The lion's share will go not to coal expenses, but to NOx
controls.  Only $35 million has been spent on continuous emission monitoring systems for SO2,
and about $45 million in additional operating and maintenance and fuel expenses through the year
2000 (Boyd and Herrin, 1995).
                                               
4 Torrens et al., 1992, p. 231, predict a Phase I sulfur premium of $1-2 per ton over the range of 1.7 lb. SO2
per mmBtu to 1.2 lb., escalating to $2-4 in Phase II. A variety of estimates ranging from $6.8 per ton to $12 per
ton are summarized in U S National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program, 1991, p. 419.Dallas Burtraw RFF 95-30REV
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Another explanation for low allowance prices that complements the hypothesis of price
competition between input markets has been generated by researchers at MIT, who suggest the
lion's share of emission reductions due in Phase I were predestined by actions taken before the
1995 start of the program (Ellerman and Montero, 1995).  Emissions from facilities affected by
Phase I totaled 9.3 million tons in 1985, and allowance allocations to these facilities for Phase I
beginning in 1995 total 6.9 million tons. But by 1993 emissions had already fallen to 7.5
million tons.  This decline was due to demographic shifts in electricity demand toward areas
more proximate to low sulfur coal, coupled with increased availability of low sulfur coal, not
only as a low cost compliance option for Title IV, but as a cheaper fuel for power production.
Hence, the decline in price of low sulfur coal may well have stimulated a decline in emissions
even in the absence of Title IV.  However, the nature of the regulatory approaches that might
have been taken in Title IV bear directly on whether this trend would have materialilzed.  The
regulatory flexibility embodied in the allowance trading program precluded mandatory
investments in unnecessary abatement technology, which characterized the 1977 Clean Air Act
Amendments.  Furthermore, the competition in input markets, especially in rail transport of
coal, apparently accelerated the trend toward the use of cleaner coal.  One must hasten to add,
however, that the early reduction in emissions may result from shifting of production to
facilities excluded from Phase I.  Typically, these facilities are cleaner and more efficient than
Phase I facilities, so this shift in production may be positive for the environment.  But assessment of
performance by looking only at Phase I facilities may be misleading.Dallas Burtraw RFF 95-30REV
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Innovations in Rail Transport
Rail transport of coal from the Powder River Basin was initiated by Burlington Northern
(BN) and CNW Corporations in the 1970s.  BN carried 83 million tons in 1979, and 146 million
tons five years later.  With CNW under financial hardship, BN operated an effective monopoly
through the middle 1980s.  By 1988, the Powder River Basin was producing 19 percent of the
nation's coal, about 180 million tons.  While national average coal prices were $22 at the
minemouth, surface-mined western coal averaged $12, and Powder River Basin prices were as
low as $5 per ton, with ample opportunity to expand production at that cost.
Transportation costs constitute about 50 percent of the total cost for low sulfur coal
from the west delivered to the east.  Coal transportation prices in the east are 20-26 mills per
ton mile.  However, competition in rail for western coal has caused prices to drop to an
average of 10-14 mills per ton mile.  During a recent bidding war to deliver Powder River
Basin coal to Georgia Power, quoted prices fell to 6.5 mills per ton mile.
Many observers in the Clean Air Act debates conjectured that bottlenecks would occur in
rail transport that would preclude western coal from playing a big role in compliance plans of
eastern utilities.  Hence price forecasts hinged on prices for low sulfur Appalachian coal that was
locally available to eastern utilities.  However, these potential bottlenecks have failed to
materialize.  The enthusiasm with which rail is competing for coal transport results from the
Staggers Act of 1980 which largely deregulated railroads.  In the 1980s rail rates fell 35 percent,
yet profits went up, due to increased flexibility in tariffs, and increased incentives to reduce costs.
The rail industry has implemented a number of innovations and improvements to meet increased
demand for western coal including laying double and triple tracks, increasing size of car fleets,Dallas Burtraw RFF 95-30REV
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increasing the number of locomotives and calling back crews, use of aluminum cars and increasing
car dump speed.  The supply of western low sulfur coal has proved able to expand to meet
opportunities presented by the 1990 CAAA.  Indeed, the experience after the Staggers Act
foreshadowed the experience in the utility industry and its input markets under the CAAA.
Innovations in Fuel Blending
Fuel blending involves the blending of high- with low-sulfur coals to reduce average SO2
emissions. Like fuel switching, fuel blending has lower capital costs than scrubbing, which affords
the utility significant flexibility to adapt compliance according to changing trends in the industry.
Nonetheless, fuel blending is believed to have an impact on the operation of the existing plant and
boiler.  Generally, electric utilities are designed for a particular type of coal.  Deviations in any of
several important properties may impair plant performance or harm equipment.5  It was thought
previously that low-sulfur subbituminous Western coal would be most troublesome in this regard
because it does not share the characteristics of commonly used bituminous coal including moisture
content, heat content and ash properties.  Experimentation prompted by the allowance trading
program has led to an improved understanding of the ability to blend fuels.  Detrimental effects of
blending have been found to be less than originally supposed.
Innovations in the Scrubber Market
Scrubbers are a capital-intensive compliance strategy with a larger initial cost and lower
operating costs than most other strategies.  The electric utility industry had relatively more
                                               
5 Equipment likely to be affected by blending coals include the coal handling system, the fuel preparation and
firing system, the primary air system, the steam generator, and the particulate removal system.Dallas Burtraw RFF 95-30REV
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experience with scrubbers prior to 1990 than with fuel switching and/or blending.  However,
previous experience did not suggest changes that were to occur.
Table 5 indicates the evolution of estimated capital costs for retrofitting a scrubber over
the last several years.  The 1989 EPRI estimates and 1994 EIA estimates are based on
installations over the last several years.  Smith and Dalton report that more recent contracts
reveal an average cost of $227 for retrofit scrubbers for Phase I of Title IV.  GAO (1994) finds
that prices have dropped by nearly half since 1989.
Table 5:  Comparisons of capital costs for spray type (wet limestone) scrubbers (fgd)





300 500 365 488 639
Capital costs
(1993$/kW)
$303-$382 a $225-$275 a $233-$282 b $274 c $227 d
aThese numbers are adjusted by a coefficient of 1.25 to reflect expected additional costs of retrofit, as prescribed in
(U S Energy Information Administration, 1994a).
bThis number is based on econometric estimates, adjusted to include overhead costs.
cBased on engineering estimates, including a 1.25 retrofit multiplier.
d 
Average size and cost of several recent scrubber installations.
Sources: EPRI, 1989; Smith and Dalton, 1995; U S Energy Information Administration, 1994a.
Previous to the CAAA, scrubber systems usually included a spare module to maintain
low emission rates when any one module was inoperative.  An important innovation in the
scrubber market is the reduced need for spare absorber modules.  As long as emission
allowances are a sufficient compliance strategy, utilities can save considerable capital costs by
eliminating the spare module and using allowances during periods of maintenance or unplanned
outage.  In addition, new scrubbers exhibit increased efficiency and reliability.  Improvements inDallas Burtraw RFF 95-30REV
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scrubber design and use of materials have reduced maintenance costs and increased utilization
rates.  (The estimate of capital costs for a 488 megawatt plant with 3.2 percent sulfur would
increase by one-third with a spare module (USEIA, 1994b, p. 92).)
Another significant technical implication of the CAAA is the incentive for improved
efficiency in scrubbing.  Increasing SO2 removal from, say, 90 percent to 95 percent can be
cost effective compared to the overall cost of SO2 removal and the opportunity cost of
allowances.  The incentives are such that upgrading of existing scrubbers through
improvements including larger modules and elimination of reheat is likely to occur (Torrens
et al., 1992, pp. 221-222).
Summary of Compliance Activities
Three estimates of the Phase I compliance activities of utilities are presented in Table 6.
Over half of the plants affected by Phase I are fuel switching and/or blending.  A primary
explanation, hinging on market fundamentals, is the low cost of this strategy.  An equally
compelling explanation, hinging on institutional issues, is that this strategy is relatively non-
capital intensive.  In a period of uncertainty regarding the allowance market, cost recovery, and
especially competitive pressures facing the entire electricity industry, fuel switching/blending is
a low fixed cost strategy that allows affected utilities to comply with little risk, at least with
regard to historic treatment of fuel costs by electricity regulators.Dallas Burtraw RFF 95-30REV
20
Table 6.  Comparison of compliance strategies estimates
Compliance Strategy GAO (94) Rico (95) EIA (94)
Switch and/or Blend Coals 55% 63% 59%
Purchase Allowancesa 3% 9% 15%
Install Scrubbers 16% 11% 10%
Pre-Phase I Complianceb 18% 15% 10%
Switch to Natural Gas/Oil 5% 1% 3%
Retire Plants/Repowering 3% 1% 2%
   Total 100% 100% 99%
a  The EIA find that 15 percent of utilities are using allowances in combination with other
strategies.
b  For Rico (1995) and GAO (1994), this includes reduced utilization, and substitution of Phase II
sources.
The market for low-sulfur coal has grown and is expected to continue growing.  Low-
sulfur western coal is penetrating midwestern and eastern markets in record quantities, and
eastern low-sulfur coal is being supplied at lower prices than anticipated as a result of
increased mining productivity, lower rail rates, and competition from western mines.
The next most common strategy is intrautility offsets among facilities and from pre-Phase I
actions.  Compliance is achieved by either over-compliance in one facility (while under-compliance
in another facility) and/or reaching compliance criteria prior to Phase I to earn bonus allowances.
Scrubber installations have been less common.  Initially scrubber vendors anticipated 35
to 40 scrubber contracts between 1995 through 1999 (U S Government Accounting Office,
1994; Torrens et al., 1992, projected eventual scrubbing of 40-50 GW by 2000 or later).  They
now only anticipate 13 to 14 contracts during Phase I.  Scrubber vendors have adjusted to the
decreasing demand for their product by introducing innovations and lowering costs.Dallas Burtraw RFF 95-30REV
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Interutility allowance trading also has been less common.  As of early 1995, only 12
utilities have bought more than 5000 emission allowances from other companies.  Illinois
Power is the only firm to rely heavily on allowances for Phase I compliance.  Carolina Power
& Light and Georgia Power are the only two firms that appear headed to do so in Phase II.
From March 1994 through March 1995, the first year of the EPA's Allowance Tracking
Program, about 28.9 million allowances were transferred.  About 1.6 million of these were
transferred between utilities, or from brokers or fuel companies to utilities (USEPA, 1995).
Convenience Value of Allowances
It would be inaccurate to claim that allowance trading plays no role in Phase I compliance.
As indicated by Table 5, trading is occurring.  Furthermore, even in the absence of extensive
trading, allowances potentially can play a constructive role in facilitating the optimal timing of
investments.  Utilities considering capital investments in scrubbers may benefit from the option to
delay investments if delay leads to the resolution of uncertainties pertaining to the planning
process.6  Many utilities have expressed reluctance to engage in new capital investments until
more is known about the direction that restructuring of the electricity industry is likely to take.
Allowances also provide insurance against unanticipated events such as unplanned equip-
ment failures.  The insurance value stems from the possibility of stiff penalties were the utility to be
                                               
6 Chao and Wilson (1993); Kaslow and Pindyck (1994).  In fact, low sulfur coal also plays this role.  In the context
of cost recovery before state PUCs, low sulfur coal may be a more flexible compliance strategy than allowances
because cost recovery of allowances does not occur until they are used (not when they are purchased).  Chao and
Wilson illustrate a "plausible"  option value of $85 on allowances valued at the marginal cost of scrubbing, assumed
to be $400.  The model is limited because of extreme assumptions about the elasticity of low sulfur coal markets.
They assume low sulfur coal supplies are allocated first, and consider the option value allowances in the face of
residual demand for scrubbing.Dallas Burtraw RFF 95-30REV
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in noncompliance.  Hence, even allowances provide sources of value that were not widely
appreciated in the design of the program, and which do not hinge on an active trading market.
4.  TITLE  IV  AS  REGULATORY  REFORM
Trading volume is transparently the wrong measure of success from the perspective of
economic efficiency.  The measure I employ is cost-effectiveness, which provides a direct
indication of the economic surplus generated by the program compared with an appropriate
alternative baseline.7  Table 7 presents two sets of  estimates of the relative annual costs for
three alternative implementation scenarios:  (1) a command and control approach to achieve the
environmental goal of Title IV, (2) limited allowance transfers only within firms which describes
prevailing practice, and (3) flexible interutility trading.  The first estimates from the US
Environmental Protection Agency, compiled by ICF Resources Inc., resulted from the most
rigorous analysis of the potential trading program before its adoption, and was used as
background by the Bush Administration in crafting the program.








ICF (1989) 3.3 - 4.7 2.7 - 4.0
GAO (1994) 4.3 2.5 1.4
Sources: (U S Environmental Protection Agency 1989, U S Government Accounting Office 1994)
                                               
7 There are, of course, other criteria for success of the program.  The most relevant is the environmental
impact.  Since total emissions are capped, the environmental criteria involve the temporal and geographical
allocation of those emissions.  These questions have been considered elsewhere.  See: Hahn and May (1994);
Rico (1995); US Government Accounting Office (1994); US National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program
(1991).  A detailed examination of subtle issues involved in implementing this measure for Title IV is
presented in Reid et al. (1994).Dallas Burtraw RFF 95-30REV
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The second estimates by the US Government Accounting Office summarizes well other
estimates that have been developed more recently, in light of rapid transitions in input markets
over the first few years of the program.8  These estimates were adjusted (interpolated) to make
them commensurate with the EPA's for the year 2001.
Three important points emerge from this comparison.  First, looking across categories
(columns) of implementation scenarios, GAO estimates that by the beginning of Phase II costs are
almost 40 percent less than under a command and control baseline.  The definition of the baseline
used by GAO is an emission rate applied to each facility, and hence yields lower estimates than
would specific technology requirements.  The cost savings GAO identifies have been achieved
primarily through internal transfers, even in the absence of rigorous allowance trading.
The second point emerges in the comparison between estimates for each category of
implementation scenario.  The EPA estimates are relatively low compared to other projections
from before passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments in 1990 in part because ICF Resources,
who conducted the analysis, maintains a sophisticated coal market model, and ICF correctly
anticipated that low sulfur coal would play the most prominent role in compliance, at least
through Phase I of the program.  Nonetheless, even under the most optimistic conditions with
the most flexible implementation scenario, EPA's lower bound for the cost of the program was
$2.7 billion per year in 2001.  In contrast, GAO finds that constrained trading conditions will
yield a cost of $2.5 billion, lower than the most optimistic projection before passage.
                                               
8 USEPA (1994) reports more recent estimates compiled by ICF Resources, Inc.  Costs in 1997 are projected to
be $1 billion, in 2000 to be $1.3 billion, and in 2010 to be $2.2 billion.  Previous analyses have estimated costs
under a command and control baseline comparable to those in the table.  See Rico (1995) for discussion.Dallas Burtraw RFF 95-30REV
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However, the third point that emerges from Table 7 is that sizable savings still remain
available through an improved trading program.  GAO estimates that potential savings total
another billion dollars a year, over 20 percent of baseline estimates.
In summary, thus far the primary mechanism of cost savings from Title IV comes not
from allowance trading directly, but from flexibility imparted by the innovative approach to
environmental regulation.  This issue was rarely anticipated in the policy or economics
literatures.  (Torrens et al., 1992, p. 219) offers one exception, in anticipating that the
dominant source of savings might come from the leveraging of allowances on input markets
promoting competitive pricing in fuel and equipment markets.
It is noteworthy that although a performance standard does not require active
allowance trading, the allowance trading program is a particularly effective way to implement a
performance standard.  In the face of uncertainty surrounding compliance strategies,
performance standards alone may be inadequate to stimulate innovation because firms may be
unwilling to experiment if failure has a high cost.  The allowance offers a convenience value as
insurance, even if they are not a primary compliance strategy themselves.
To date, low sulfur coal has provided a commonly available low marginal cost option to
the majority of utilities which has allowed the implementation of Phase I of Title IV to achieve
environmental goals in a relatively cost effective manner.  Under any circumstances, including
the existence of a fluid trading market, one would not expect to observe significant allowance
trading when a low cost compliance option is commonly available.  The institutional obstacles
that tend to hinder development of a liquid allowance market are irrelevant in this case.Dallas Burtraw RFF 95-30REV
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Whether low sulfur coal will continue to provide a commonly available low cost
compliance strategy in Phase II is uncertain.  Estimates in Table 7 show costs increasing over
time with only internal trading due to expected depletion of Appalachian low-sulfur coal and of
allowances banked during Phase I.  Absent a robust trading market, performance of Title IV
depends importantly on the long run elasticity of supply for low sulfur coal.  If this option
becomes dear, some firms will turn toward other options (e.g., scrubbing) which are likely to
exhibit significant differences in marginal costs among firms.  Then the potential role for
allowance trading will grow in importance.  As others have argued, the current patterns of
inadequate or parochial regulatory oversight may prove more important and the emission allowance
trading program may prove to be considerably less successful than it has to date (Bohi, 1994).
Like deregulation of railroads and natural gas, Phase I of Title IV appears to be
primarily a vehicle for regulatory reform.  The central theme of Title IV involves the use of
market forces for environmental protection.  In this respect, Title IV has been a success.
Innovative means of compliance have been developed, many of which were not anticipated.
Nonetheless, it is uncertain whether this success can carry over to Phase II without a boost in
allowance trading activity.Dallas Burtraw RFF 95-30REV
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